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Abstract 
 
 The elevation of scarcity to the fundamental economic problem rests on some 
unstated normative assumptions. These include a political commitment to private 
property, a methodological commitment to not inquire about taste formation, and the idea 
that human welfare is roughly equivalent to preference satisfaction.  
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1. Introduction:  
 
Foucault’s research reveals that “modern human sciences (biological, psychological, 
social) purport to offer universal scientific truths about human nature that are, in fact, often mere 
expressions of ethical and political commitments of a particular society.”1 Our goal in this paper 
is to argue that the current grounding of economic theory in the apparently objective, 
neutral, and widely observable condition of scarcity is actually based on certain 
underlying methodological, ethical and political commitments.    
 
Lionel Robbins (1932) argued the economics was not about “material welfare: the 
provision of goods to further prosperity and development” but rather, it was about “scarcity:  the 
provision of goods to fulfill all wants”, whether conducive to welfare or not.  His arguments 
came to dominate the field, and drove earlier conceptions out of sight; see Cooter and 
Rapopport (1984) for details. Nearly all modern conventional textbooks use scarcity as 
the fundamental defining problem of economics. For instance, the opening paragraph of a 
microeconomics textbook by Perloff (2001) states that: “If each of us could get all of the 
food, clothing and toys we wanted without working, no one would study economics. Unfortunately, 
most of the good things in life are scarce – we can’t all have as much as we want. Thus scarcity is 
the mother of economics.”  
 
 Both logical positivism and Weber’s idea that  social science must be value-free 
strongly influenced the development of economic methodology in the early twentieth 
century.  The full implications of the subsequent collapse of logical positivism have yet 
to be absorbed. Even deeper is the realization that facts and values often cannot be 
sharply separated. Even Quine, whose attack on the “two dogmas” of empiricism was 
influential in destroying positivism, did not accept the idea that values were also involved 
in the formation and formulation, as well as acceptance and rejection, of scientific 
theories. Putnam (2002) provides a detailed exposition of these ideas, and shows how 
aesthetic and epistemic values of elegance, simplicity, coherence, power etc. are 
inevitably involved in the selection of scientific theories.  
 
Some statements are clearly factual and objective, while others are clearly evaluative and 
normative. It does not follow that all sentences can be classified into one or the other 
category; see Mongin (2006) for  several illustrations. Deeper examination, as in 
Hausman and McPherson (2006), shows that facts and values are entangled and cannot be 
separated in a large class of statements central to economic theories. As a whole, there 
has been only peripheral recognition of these issues among economists. A recent survey 
by Hands (2009) concludes that: “So most modern economists generally consider rational 
choice theory to be a positive, not a normative, theory; endorse the position that normative 
statements/concepts should be prohibited from scientific economics; and equate normative 
                                                 
1
 This is a paraphrase of the entry for Michel Foucault in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (accessed 
23 February 2008): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/; it has since been revised, but because it so 
aptly describes our main theme in this paper, we have retained the quote. 
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theories/presuppositions with ethics.”  Learning to think without the empiricist dogmas that 
have been part of our training is a real challenge, with correspondingly great potential 
promise. Paraphrasing Putnam (2002), developing a methodology which takes into 
account the collapse of positivism as well as the collapse of the fact/value distinction will 
open up “a whole new field of intellectual possibilities in every important area.” In this paper, we 
hope to demonstrate the necessity of pursuing developments along these lines by showing 
how values are built into the foundations of modern economic theory.     
  
2. Logical Positivism and the Elimination of Values 
 
The emergence of scientific knowledge in conflict with, and as a rival to, religious 
knowledge, led to a study of the “demarcation problem” – how to differentiate (and prove 
the superiority of) scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge. This program 
reached a highly successful culmination with the emergence of the philosophy of logical 
positivism in the early twentieth century. Here “successful” means that the philosophy 
was overwhelmingly accepted by scholars for a large part of the twentieth century, not 
that it was correct. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed so many difficulties that 
even its main proponents were forced admit2 that it was nearly “all wrong”. For example, 
a modern empiricist Van Fraassen (1980, p. 2) writes: “Logical positivism, … even if one is 
quite charitable … had a rather spectacular crash.”  Suppe (1977) provides the epitaph, a 
detailed and comprehensive discussion of reasons why empiricism was eventually 
abandoned by philosophers. 
      
According to the positivist philosophy, scientific statements were based on 
observations and logical deductions from them. Statements which could not be verified or 
disconfirmed by observations were meaningless. In particular, values, ethics and moral 
judgments were not scientific, and in effect meaningless, except as an expression of an 
emotional attachment. This effectively relegated a huge portion of existing knowledge, 
which included religious knowledge, to the dustbin. Julie Reuben (1996) writes that: 
 
In the late nineteenth century, intellectuals assumed that truth had spiritual, moral 
and cognitive dimensions. By 1930, however, intellectuals had abandoned this 
broad conception of truth.    They embraced, instead, a view of knowledge that 
drew a sharp distinction between “facts” and “values”. They associated cognitive 
truth with empirically verified knowledge and maintained that by this standard, 
moral values could not be validated as “true.”  In the nomenclature of the twentieth 
century, only “science” constituted true knowledge. Moral or spiritual values could 
be “true” in an emotional or nonliteral sense, but not in terms of cognitively 
verifiable knowledge. The term “truth” no longer comfortably encompassed factual 
knowledge and moral values.  
   
                                                 
2
 Ayer himself in later life is supposed to have remarked about Language, Truth, and Logic that it was “all 
wrong” – http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/A.J._Ayer  Accessed 25 Sep 2009. 
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 In this section, we briefly discuss three powerful and widely believed positivist 
arguments for keeping values out of scientific discourse. Variants of all three are 
contained in the following quote from Ayer (1936) : 
 
We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity 
of ethical judgements. It is not because they have an ‘absolute’ validity which is 
mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no 
objective validity whatsoever . . . They are pure expressions of feeling and as such 
do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for 
the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable[as a 
statement] – because they do not express genuine propositions. 
 
2.1 Positivist Objections to Values 
 
Hausman and MacPherson (2006, Introduction) provide a more detailed discussion of all 
three of these objections and answers to them.  
 
1: Values are not scientifically meaningful because they do not correspond to any 
observable phenomena.  [“independent of sense experience” - Ayer] 
   
The positivist idea that facts must be verifiable by confrontation with direct experience 
ran into trouble with gravitational fields, charges on electrons, and many other theoretical 
entities which could not be parsed out of existence as being convenient shorthand 
descriptions of sensory data.  Mathematical concepts are meaningful even though they do 
not correspond to any observable entities, and are not analytic in the sense that the 
positivists sought to show. Putnam (2002) provides a sophisticated philosophical 
discussion, while Hausman and McPherson (2006) provide an intuitive approach. The 
upshot is that concepts like charges, cruelty, alienation and exploitation can be 
meaningful without having any direct connection with observable entities. Indeed, the 
charge of ambiguity and meaninglessness applied to ethical values can be reversed; 
Putnam and Walsh (2010, draft) cite an observation of White that the concept of 
“stealing” seems crystal clear, when compared with the central positivist idea of 
“observability,” which has been critiqued and re-defined many times and continues to be 
controversial.  
 
2: A moral judgment is an imperative – a demand for action, or an expression of “ought” 
– which cannot be assessed for truth or falsity.  [“do not come under the category of truth or 
falsehood.” -- Ayer] 
 
The positivist conception of knowledge as statements to which the binary attribute 
of true/false is applicable is too narrow. Consider for example, alternative strategies for 
treating cancer, which have different implications on longevity and quality of life during 
and after treatment.  Like choices among lifestyles, comparative statements like “strategy 
A is preferable to strategy B”  may not have truth values, but nonetheless fall within the 
scope of scientific investigation. Subjective evaluation of relative tolerance of different 
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potential side effects must be combined with gathering data on past comparable cases, 
and making inferences to potential probabilities of different outcomes. A more striking 
example arises from the Gödel undecidability of the continuum hypothesis (CH); see 
Cohen (1967) for a lucid presentation.  Both CH and its negation are consistent with the 
Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms for set theory, and therefore neither true nor false. Both Cohen 
and Gödel came to the view that choice among the two must be based on intuitive 
grounds.   
 
The naïve view that empirical and objective issues can be isolated, and studied in 
separation from the value based and subjective issues can be challenged on many 
grounds. Some aspects of the complex interdependence between preference, beliefs, 
welfare, and normative policy choices are explored in Hausman and McPherson  (1994, 
and also 2006 Section 8.3.1.). 
 
3. Value judgments are subjective, arbitrary and cannot be discussed rationally. There is 
no way to resolve disagreements.  [“unverifiable … as a cry of pain” -- Ayer]   
 
To refute these positivist views, widely echoed in popular economics textbooks, it is 
enough to cite Sen (1987), Putnam (2002), as well as Hausman and McPherson (2006) 
both as counterexamples (rational discussions of value judgments) and refutations (they 
show how to discuss value judgments rationally). This positivist idea is predicated on the 
possibility of sharp separation of facts and values. Mongin (2006) and Putnam (2002) 
give several examples of statements which generate substantial controversy regarding 
whether they should be classified as facts or values. At the same time, it is easy to give 
examples of value judgments which command substantially greater consensus.  
 
2.2 Current Philosophy of Science 
 
As we live and learn, we acquire a large amount of knowledge about the world we live in. 
The positivists conferred a special status on scientific knowledge, acquired by 
observation of indisputable facts and built upon by solid logical inference. Intuitively, I 
feel just as certain about my knowledge that it is wrong to wantonly murder innocents as 
I do about my knowledge that the walls around me are painted yellow. Positivists sought 
to show that the first kind of knowledge (of values) was an illusion and “meaningless.” 
 
After describing the “spectacular crash of logical positivism,” and the “shifting sands of 
philosophical fortune,”   Van Fraasen (1980, p. 2) devotes his book to the study of “what 
problems are faced by the aspiring empiricist today?” (italics in the original). The 
conclusions are surprisingly weak and tentative, and a far cry from the confident and 
sharp assertions of the positivists. Philosophers of science have not abandoned the idea of 
establishing the superiority of scientific knowledge. The editors of the Handbook of the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences set out to establish the distinguishing characteristics of 
scientific knowledge. In a review of this Handbook, Agassi (2009) writes that “it reflects 
fairly well the gloomy state of affairs in this subfield,” and describes the large number of 
unresolved controversies in the field.    
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The Pragmatic Tradition in philosophy was eclipsed by positivism through most of 
the twentieth century, but is now enjoying a revival. One of the key claims of this 
tradition is that all of our knowledge (scientific, religious, moral, social, etc.) is similar. 
Thus, as Agassi (2009) writes, “there is neither need nor possibility to justify science and 
forbid dissent from it.” Acceptance of this point of view would lead to a dramatic shift in 
the current methodology of economics – our knowledge of “science” and “values” are 
based on the same epistemological principles, and hence the exclusion of values from 
scientific discourse is arbitrary and unjustified. Some object to the idea of the 
epistemological parity of scientific and ethical theories because they do not see how to 
explain the possibility of ethical knowledge. Putnam (2002, p 45) raises this objection as 
the reason the fact/value dichotomy is tempting, and gives a surprising answer: 
 
The very idea of explaining in absolute terms how ethical knowledge is possible … seems 
to me ridiculous. … it seems impossible to explain how thought, belief, and reference is 
possible. … Indeed, the long history of failures to explain in metaphysical terms how 
mathematics is possible, how nondemonstrative knowledge is possible (the so-called 
“problem of induction”), and so on, suggests that nothing much follows from the failure of 
philosophy to come up with an explanation of anything in “absolute terms.” 
   
The attempt to keep economics “scientific” and  “value free” has meant that values have 
been buried out of sight in the framework chosen and in the methodology. We will try to 
dig these values out from underneath the foundations of scarcity.  
 
3. The Three Pillars of Scarcity  
 
In this section, our goal is to establish that mainstream economic theory is committed to 
three norms which serve to make scarcity the central economic problem. We also sketch 
a history of how these norms were adopted in economic methodology. The first of these 
three is a commitment to private property; the political nature of this commitment is clear 
from the existence of societies with radically different notions of property. The second is 
a methodological decision not to investigate the formation of tastes. This demarcates a 
discipline boundary, and is a methodological norm. We are defining what a economist 
should and should not study, and textbooks argue that this is the proper role of an 
economist. The third pillar is the equation of welfare with preference satisfaction. This 
means that economists should try to satisfy preferences of all members of the society. 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that we use norms in a much broader sense 
than just “ethics” or “morality.” Also, the significance of examining the history of 
thought requires some justification, presented below. 
 
Why study history of thought? The positivist view of science as a collection of 
universal truths, arrived at by logical deductions from indisputable facts, allows no role 
for history. Closer examination reveals that the “under-determination” of theories by 
observations is ubiquitous; see Rashid (2009) for an illuminating discussion. When a 
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variety of theories fit all available observations, choice among them must be made on 
other grounds. Kuhn (1970, p. 4) writes that “an apparently arbitrary element, compounded of 
personal and historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the beliefs espoused by a 
given scientific community at a given time.” It is in light of this non-positivist understanding 
that it is useful to examine the history of thought. It highlights the historical contingency 
of apparently universal truths.  
 
The definition of social norms: In order to function, every society must reach agreement 
on many issues, including ethical, social, political and legal structures. The set of implicit 
and explicit agreements as to how the society will be governed, how disputes will be 
settled, which types of education will be recognized as entitlements to jobs, which side of 
the road to drive on, behaviors which will be approved and those which will be subject to 
social or legal sanctions, etc. can all be termed part of the “social contract.” Universally 
agreed upon elements of the social contract form part of the foundational framework in 
which discussions are carried out, and often remain unexamined. Putnam (2002) has 
emphasized that social norms (all elements of the social contract) include judgments 
about relative aesthetic values of different scientific theories, agreements about 
methodological principles, and are not restricted to ethics and morality, the traditional 
areas covered by the Ten Commandments.  
 
3.1 Locke’s Theories of Property 
 
The institution of private property is taken for granted, and alternatives do not 
receive serious discussion in most economics textbooks. Neoclassical models describe an 
abstract economy where all agents possess certain endowments. Common ownership and 
shared resources create ‘externalities’ and are ruled out ab initio in simpler models. How 
agents came into possession of their endowments, and whether the society can or should 
pool resources to solve economic problems does not receive any discussion. We sketch 
some key historical developments which led to the emergence of current widespread 
social norms regarding private property. More recently, the extension of these concepts 
beyond the paradigmatic ‘land’ has led to renewed interest among economists. See 
Dragun (1987) for a survey.       
 
Philosopher John Locke was among the leading architects of modern thought. 
Locke’s theories of property are his most important contribution to political thought. 
Variants of these theories continue to provide the philosophical basis for capitalist 
economies to this day. One of the key ideas is that private property exists as a natural 
right of human beings prior to the formation of governments. Furthermore, legitimate 
governments are created by mutual consent of citizens so as to protect the natural rights 
of the citizens. For example, Locke (1690) writes that "The reason why men enter into 
society is the preservation of their property."  
 
One of the main goals of secular political thought is to allow people with different 
religions to coexist peacefully under a common rule of law. An essential ingredient in 
achieving this goal is the idea of individual freedom. To make room for diverse religious 
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rules, we allow for maximum possible freedom compatible with a social order. Thus the 
social contract in general is not subject to a priori constraints. Any set of rules that all 
people agree to will serve. So this move of providing privilege to property so that it is not 
subject to the social contract is a bit odd. When we negotiate among ourselves to create 
common rules to live by, we may not discuss the idea of private property. Locke (1690) 
writes that those entering into a social contract “cannot intend to give any one or more an 
absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the 
magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them.” Locke requires 
both "persons and estates" to be protected from the arbitrary power of any magistrate, 
inclusive of the "power and will of a legislator." Depredations against an estate are just as 
plausible a justification for resistance and revolution as are those against persons.  
 
Why did Locke’s theory of property emerge as the dominant one in England, 
eventually removing all alternatives from view? History provides important clues. Battles 
among monarchs were common, and taking property from the losers and awarding them 
to supporters was extremely common. Cromwell’s rebellion was a watershed event in 
British history. Even though monarchy was eventually restored, the power of the landed 
aristocracy against the monarchs was firmly established and continued to increase after 
this time. Secure property rights for landowners, not subject to the arbitrary will of 
monarchs, supported this power configuration and therefore emerged as the dominant 
theory. Tawney (1926) provides details of how political and religious upheavals in the 
post-Cromwell world made possible the social revolution created by the movement of 
“enclosures,” or the privatization of public property. Kogl (2005) summarizes how 
“enclosures” of common lands in the post-Cromwell period led to the emergence of 
modern notions of private property.  This political commitment to private property is an 
essential ingredient in the emergence of scarcity as a central economic problem of a 
society.  
 
 
 
3.2 De Gustibus non est Disputandum. 
 
 
It is a methodological decision on part of economists not to analyze tastes. For 
example, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989, p 26) state that economists “must reckon with 
consumer wants and needs whether they are genuine or contrived.” Note the imperative form, 
which nonetheless appears meaningful, and subject to rational argument. Similarly, 
Stigler and Becker (1977)  make the normative claim that “Tastes are the unchallengeable 
axioms of a man's behavior:” An economist is not allowed to question how tastes and wants 
are determined. Stigler and Becker (1977) also write that “On the traditional view an 
explanation of economic phenomena that reaches a difference in tastes between people or  times 
is the terminus of the argument: the problem is abandoned at this point to whoever studies and 
explains tastes (psychologists? anthropologists? phrenologists? sociobiologists?).” This 
delineates a sharp discipline boundary, and a subliminal suggestion that it is not 
altogether respectable to study tastes.  
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Modern textbooks reflect this methodological commitment by taking utility 
functions as given. The origins, causes, flexibility, variations and intensities of these 
preferences are not the subject of economic analysis.  Cooter and Rapaport (1984) 
provide a history of the transition from cardinal to ordinal utility, and argue that contrary 
to what is widely believed, this did not represent scientific progress. Similarly, Wong 
(2009) argues that Samuelson’s attempt to replace ordinal utility by ‘revealed preference’ 
fails to achieve its methodological goals. It is this last transition, discussed in greater 
detail below, which led to the idea that we cannot question tastes. Attempts to study how 
tastes are formed, how they change, and how they relate to satisfaction, welfare, 
happiness, etc. require going beyond observable choices, and hence are not ‘scientific’ 
according to positivist views.  
 
3.2.1 Positivism leads to Revealed Preference 
 
The positivist program of focusing on observables alone was extremely influential 
in the development of all sciences in the twentieth century. For instance, behavioral 
psychologists sought to study observable behaviors instead of unobservable emotional 
states. Similarly, economists sought to replace cardinal utility based on unobservable 
states of satisfaction and pleasure with more scientific and observable counterparts. This 
is why the Hicks-Allen reformulation of utility theory, which showed how all relevant 
economic concepts could be formulated using ordinal utility was hailed as a “revolution.”  
Because ordinal utility is still based on the unobservable preferences of the consumer, the 
attempt was made to replace it with observable choices.  Samuelson (cited in Wong, 
2009) writes of “The discrediting of utility as a psychological concept” as the reason for his 
development of “revealed preference” theory.  Wong (2009) provides an illuminating 
discussion of the methodological developments which led to ordinal utility and onwards 
to revealed preference. He has also shown how this research program fails in its 
methodological objectives. Because of the close correspondence between choices and 
preferences, assumptions about choices amount to assumptions about preferences. The 
mathematical equivalence of ordinal utility theory with revealed preference theory was 
demonstrated by Houthakker (1950). 
 
3.2.2 Errors of Positivism are Reflected in Revealed Preference 
 
Since choices reflect preferences, we cannot avoid reasoning about unobservables 
by focusing on choices alone. Any observable patterns in choices can only be due to 
patterns in the underlying preferences; if preferences do not exist (or are complex, 
conflicting and incomplete) then choices would not be subject to any logic at all. This 
issue is still not clearly understood by many. For example, Binmore (2009) writes “ We 
accept that people are infinitely various, but we succeed in accommodating their infinite variety 
within a single theory by denying ourselves the luxury of speculating about what is going on inside 
their heads. Instead, we pay attention only to what we see them doing.” Binmore, like 
Samuelson before him, fails to recognize that assumptions about (or descriptions of) 
choices are necessarily assumptions about preferences, or motivations for these choices. 
If observable choices follow simple rules, then motivations of people are not infinitely 
varied in the context under discussion. We focus on choices because of our strong 
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intuition that the underlying preferences are stable enough to build a theory upon. 
Modern utility theory places strong, testable, and falsifiable restrictions on choice 
behavior, and by implication, equally strong restrictions on possible motivations for these 
choices. Therefore, Binmore’s assertion that “modern theory of utility makes a virtue of 
assuming nothing whatever about what causes our behavior” is not correct. In fact, 
extrapolations, predictions and explanations of patterns in choice behavior are only 
possible if we postulate underlying preferences which give rise to these patterns. Wong 
(2009) provides a more detailed and complete discussion.  
 
3.3 Welfare is Preference Satisfaction. 
 
Lerner (1971) writes that “as an economist I must be concerned with the mechanisms for 
getting people what they want, no matter how these wants were acquired.”  Similarly, 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989, p. 2) write that economists “must reckon with consumer 
wants and needs whether they are genuine or contrived. Shakespeare’s King Lear said, “Reason 
not the need” – and economists do not; rather they analyze how limited goods get rationed among 
whatever wants a society generates.” After establishing that classical economists did not 
share these views, Hausman and MacPherson (2006) describe the transition to these 
modern views as follows:   
 
In modern economic theory as developed in the 1930s, economists put aside 
substantive conceptions of well-being, such as wealth or happiness. Because they 
found that the basic propositions of demand theory and consumer behavior could 
be accounted for simply by supposing that people had stable preference rankings 
with certain properties, most  economists took well-being to be the satisfaction of 
preferences. 
 
If we follow positivist dicta, it is almost inevitable that we will equate welfare with 
preference with choice, since only choices are directly observable. Also, avoiding 
discussion of the deep and complex notion of human welfare creates the impression that 
we take no stand on this issue. In fact, discussions of market failures, optimal taxation, 
advantages of free trade, etc. are all predicated on implicit views about human welfare. 
Hausman and Macpherson (2006, Chapter 8) make these views explicit and provide a 
clear and detailed discussion of how these are not tenable. Below, we briefly examine 
some objections to the “standard view” of human welfare implicitly espoused in modern 
economic theory. 
 
1. It is immediately obvious from introspection that welfare, preference and 
choice are three different things. Spinach is good for me (welfare), but I may 
prefer ice cream. I may override my preferences and choose spinach to please 
my mother. Because mental states are not observable, Ayer initially denied 
their existence. He later recanted, saying that denying the existence of my own 
internal mental states is tantamount to ‘feigning anesthesia’; logical 
consistency demands accepting the same for others.   
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2. Cooter and Rapaport (1984) write that classical authors regarded utility from 
consumption as being based on observables like health and productive 
capacity rather then internal mental states. Thus objective and quantifiable 
measures of welfare are available. Construction of indices of well-being based 
on ideas of Sen, Mahbubul-Haq, Nussbaum, and others is an active area of 
research.  
3. In practice, governmental bodies routinely arrive at consensus on “basic 
needs,” which can be considered as the most urgent preferences. Such 
consensus is required to design welfare programs in operation in most 
countries. Thus as a purely empirical matter, people can argue, resolve 
disputes and arrive at consensus regarding welfare. 
4. For assessing welfare, it is crucial to distinguish between needs and wants. 
Restricting attention to choices make it impossible to make this distinction. 
Raiklin and Uyar (1996) argue that eliminating the needs/wants distinction 
“has meant also that the moral and social implications of such comparisons 
and discussions could be kept out of economic theory and analysis.”  
4. Alternatives to Scarcity 
 
 We have discussed how modern economic theory is based on a political 
commitment to private property, a methodological prohibition on exploring taste 
formation, and a preference satisfaction view of human welfare. We now show how 
considering alternative commitments has the potential to replace scarcity as the 
fundamental principle of economic theory. This will also show some of the new vistas for 
research opened up by explicit consideration of values. 
4.1 Alternatives to private property 
 
 The Cherokee Constitution of 1839 states that “The lands of the Cherokee Nation 
shall remain common property.” In a society where land is common property, and provides 
amply for basic necessities of food and shelter, scarcity would not emerge as the 
fundamental economic problem. “Economists” in such a society would probably spend 
time on studying rules for sharing, and methods for resolving the commons problem, and 
settling intra and inter-tribal disputes regarding usage of common property. This is made 
more plausible by looking at the case of England, below.  
 
 In England, Tawney (1926) describes how political and religious upheavals in the 
post-Cromwell world made possible the social revolution created by the movement of 
“enclosures,” or the privatization of public property. Traditional ideas of how to handle 
sharing of common property were forgotten. Kogl (2005) writes that  
 
“Commons rights enabled persons to meet many everyday needs: not only by 
pasturing livestock and raising crops in the open fields, but cutting turfs (peat for 
fuel) and wood (for building and fuel), hunting game, and foraging for wild foods 
and building materials as well. All these rights were precisely named (e.g. right of 
turbary, right of botes) and lands were precisely delineated as pasture (mead or 
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meadow), agriculture lands (the open fields), or “wastes” and woods. The 
precision with which the commons systems defined lands under different types of 
ownership is reflected in a rich vocabulary—of carrs, gores, selions and so on—
that we have largely lost today. The English common property regime was far from 
a vague, first-come first-served system in which everybody and nobody owned the 
land.”   
 
This shows that institutional and social structures evolve to handle common property 
rights. Polanyi (1944) has argued at length that market societies are exceptional, and that 
production and distribution are handled via a variety of different social institutions in 
non-market societies. Economic problems are formulated and solved quite differently in 
such societies. 
 
 As a third example, consider an idealized communist society, based on public 
ownership of means of production and an ethical commitment to providing to ‘each 
according to his needs.’  In such a society, the central economic problem might well be 
providing suitable incentives to workers to ensure high productivity. Substantial recent 
economic literature shows that non-monetary incentives can be more effective than 
monetary incentives in improving labor productivity; see, for example, Ariely (2008, 
Chapter 4). This literature which studies the impact of social mechanisms like gift 
exchange on efforts put in by laborers may be a central concern in such economies.     
 
Some would argue, like Fukuyama (1992), that all alternatives have proven non-
viable, and history has converged to the optimal economic and political structures of 
capitalism. However there are several empirical and normative claims within such a 
statement, which have been discussed at length in associated literatures. In this paper, our 
purpose is not to discuss the relative merits of alternative arrangements, but merely to 
show that it is a normative decision for a society as a whole to choose among alternative 
ways of structuring property rights. Such structures may determine whether we live in 
wealthy societies with aggressive competitors, high luxury and inequality, or relatively 
poorer but more egalitarian societies with norms of cooperation and community. The idea 
that everyone would prefer to live in a wealthier society (since it would be, at least 
potentially, a Pareto improvement), is itself clearly normative. It is harmful to bury the 
normative choices involved and present private property as a fact of nature, a part of a 
scientific and “positive” theory. 
 
4.2 Studying the Formation of Tastes 
 
Putting the study of tastes outside discipline boundaries is not a viable option for 
economists, despite what Samuelson and Stigler say. We show how different possibilities 
lead to drastically different recommendations for economic policies.  
 
1. Once basic needs are met, preferences and satisfaction is determined by 
comparisons with others. If average consumption in the society rises, I 
must acquire more to maintain the same level of satisfaction. This theory 
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of taste formation has a radical implications for welfare and efficiency of 
economic policies. This externality in the utility function leads to a rat 
race. Everyone works hard to get ahead of others, but there is no net gain 
to society in terms of satisfaction and welfare (except for reductions in 
poverty). In such a society, encouragement to relax, enjoy life, not be 
competitive would be effective in increasing welfare. GNP per capita 
would be a very poor measure of progress; a headcount of the poor would 
be a more accurate indicator. Scarcity cannot be eliminated by increased 
production but by reductions in conspicuous consumption and envy, and 
teaching contentment. Given these radical implications, surely economists 
cannot afford to be agnostics on this issue. 
  
2. Galbraith has argued that industrial societies over-produce and use 
advertisements to create artificial demand for the excess supply of 
products. If this is true, then refusal to analyze tastes serves corporate 
needs rather than society as a whole. On this view, over-production rather 
than scarcity is the central problem of industrial societies. 
 
3. It is plausible to suppose that preferences depend on how children are 
brought up, and that this is subject to social consensus. If our movies 
lionize Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi, our children will learn to be 
ascetics. If we portray warriors as heroes, our children will learn to enjoy 
war. If we teach cooperation, self-sacrifice, generosity and community to 
our children, they will learn these values. There is substantial empirical 
evidence to support the idea that social consensus will determine what we 
consider to be the entitlement of the poor. As Sen (1983) has shown, it is 
this, rather than scarcity which creates famines. 
 
Again, it is not our goal to argue for any particular theory of taste formation, but just to 
note that the issue is crucial to topics of fundamental importance in economics. Different 
theories lead to different roles for scarcity. As such, we cannot afford to place this issue 
outside the discipline boundaries of economics. 
 
4.3 Direct Measures of Welfare. 
 
 As we have argued earlier, modern economic theory implicitly assumes that 
human welfare roughly corresponds with preference satisfaction. Hausman and 
Macpherson (2006) have explained in detail why this is highly implausible, and 
suggested several alternatives. Below we discuss some alternative views on welfare 
which have the effect of displacing scarcity as the fundamental economic problem. 
 
1. Suppose a society (like the Amish) considers simple lifestyles more conducive to 
welfare than consumerism. Scarcity or excess of material goods is not of concern 
except as a means to sustain life. Economists in such a society might formulate 
the following alternative to the Pareto principle: 
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Pareto-Style Longevity Principle: A re-allocation of resources is improves social 
welfare if life expectancy of some member is increased, while no ones life 
expectancy is adversely affected by the change. 
  
This is an objective, apparently value free, criteria with radically different 
implications for economic policies compared to the standard Pareto criterion. It 
would re-define the role of scarcity in the economic system. 
 
2. Basic Needs, the capabilities approach of Sen and Nussbaum, and the Human 
Development approach of Mahbubul Haq, are the intellectual heirs of the material 
welfare approach of classical economists. Adopting this idea of welfare, as 
opposed to preference satisfaction, would give ‘scarcity’ a different meaning. 
Conventional views hold scarcity to be a result of unlimited wants in pursuit of 
limited goods. In material aspects, these new approaches to welfare would focus 
on health, food and water, education, shelter etc. Scarcity would refer to 
inadequate food supplies, insufficient numbers of doctors, schools, homes, etc. 
Many studies suggest that material resources are sufficient to meet basic needs for 
everyone. The fundamental economic problem would then be one of distribution 
rather than scarcity.   
  
3. Communitarians offer the polar opposite of the individualistic view of welfare 
espoused by economists. To see how placing community welfare above individual 
concerns affects scarcity, consider the case of precautionary savings. Suppose 
every individual has a small risk of a catastrophic event. Suppose also that due to 
adverse selection, moral hazard, unquantifiable probabilities, or ambiguities in 
specifying the event,  insurance markets fail to exist. In an individualistic society, 
everyone must save for his potential rainy day, leading to a potentially huge 
demand for resources. If one can count on community support in case of disaster, 
far fewer resources would be required, averting scarcity.  
 
In this section, we have demonstrated that replacing any one of the three pillars leads to 
substantial changes in the role of scarcity within an economic system. This shows how 
these normative commitments lead to the emergence of scarcity as the fundamental 
economic problem. 
 
5. Entanglement of Facts and Values 
 
 
We have argued that values are implicit in idea that scarcity is the fundamental defining 
concept of economics. The idea that facts and values cannot be separated flies in the face 
of received wisdom in economics. In this section, we present two more general 
arguments as to why facts and values are inextricably entangled in all scientific theory. 
 
  15 
5.1 The “Copernican Revolution” of Kant 
 
The emergence of logical positivism led to the loss of precious, hard-won, and deep 
insights of Kant into the nature of human knowledge. Because of the complexity of Kant, 
many interpretations have emerged. Our discussion below follows Gardner (1999). 
Aspects relevant to the fact/value distinction can be summarized as follows.  
 
 
Reality generates signals which impact on our physiological equipment for detecting our 
environment as sensory data (A). This sense data is interpreted (by our mind) to create a 
model of reality (B). The process of interpretation also involves some prior knowledge 
represented in (C). According to Kant, a central concern of traditional metaphysics was 
the correspondence between our models of reality and reality itself, labeled D in the 
diagram. The question “Do electrons, charges, gravitational fields, energy exist?” reflects 
this concern – do these terms in our models of physics correspond to objects in reality out 
there? Two key insights of Kant which he termed a “Copernican Revolution” in 
philosophy are  
 
1: [Negative] It is impossible to assess whether our representation of reality is a faithful 
and accurate representation of reality. This is because we have no independent access to 
reality, other than by our models of reality. We can and do construct, compare and 
evaluate different models of reality along many different dimensions. However, we 
cannot judge these models on the crucial dimension of which is a more accurate 
representation of reality, because models are all we have.  
 
2: [Positive] One can make progress in epistemology by focusing on (B) and (C), the 
process by which we transform the chaotic jumble of sense data about the real world into 
a coherent model of reality.  
 
 
In accordance with this Kantian insight, “Do electrons exist?” is the wrong question – we 
can never know whether our models of reality accurately represent what is out there. A 
more modest question is: “do electrons help in the process of sorting our sense data into a 
coherent model of reality?”  Here the answer is clearly “yes, currently they do.” But a 
Sense 
Data, 
Perception 
REALITY 
Model/s of 
REALITY 
Prior 
Knowledge 
A 
B 
 
C 
D 
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later theory may come along which dispenses with electrons and creates a more 
“interesting, informative, appealing, or elegant” picture of reality. At which point, 
electrons will blink out of existence, like ether. This pragmatic approach to ontology 
became the accepted resolution of debates about the existence of unicorns after Russell 
parsed them out of existence. 
 
The facts/value distinction is based on the positivist attempt to solve the “impossible” 
problem of (D). Positivists claim that facts reflect features of the real world. Since we 
cannot point to any feature of the world out there that is a “value,” values don’t exist. The 
Kantian answer is that electrons and values are both useful as devices to create a coherent 
picture of reality. A disturbing implication is that there are no “facts” if we understand 
facts as sentences which directly describe features of reality out there. These were the 
observation sentences of the positivists. Attempts to clearly define “facts” along positivist 
lines – unmediated sense data, providing clear sharp and accurate information about 
reality – ran into trouble in many different ways, and forced many alternative 
reformulations before being eventually abandoned. Putnam (2002) has given a detailed 
discussion of the problems faced by positivists in defining “facts” clearly. 
 
This does not mean that we cannot distinguish between facts and values, but only that we 
cannot do so along the lines suggested by the positivists: one category is real and 
objective, while the other is subjective and has no correspondent observables.  
 
Another important insight from Kant is the necessity of prior knowledge in creating a 
coherent model of reality – the path (C) . This conflicts with the positivist idea that 
science is purely objective knowledge of the real world, without any underlying 
subjective or prior judgements. An interesting confirmation of Kant’s idea is furnished by 
the fundamental theorem of statistical decision theory, according to which all admissible 
decision rules are approximately Bayes; see Ferguson (1967, Chapter 2) for a clear 
exposition. This means that all valid statistical inference procedures mix information 
from data with information from prior judgments to arrive at a decision. There are no 
purely objective ways of looking at the world.  
 
5.2   The Duhem-Quine Thesis 
 
Exploration of positivist theories of knowledge led to the understanding that our 
theories about the world must be evaluated as a whole. It is not possible to separate an 
individual sentence X of a given theory and ask whether it is true or false, analytic or 
synthetic etc. The interpretation of the sentence is only possible within the context of the 
theory as a whole. As a result, any analysis of the sentence is always conditional on the 
assumption of the validity of the background theory to which it belongs. This makes it 
impossible to distinguish sentences with empirical contents from those without. Several 
examples exist in the literature of definitions which are motivated by empirical 
regularities. On the surface, the definition is an analytic truth. Deeper examination shows 
that it has empirical content, since the definition was made to crystallize an empirical 
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regularity, and summarize a pattern of observations. This is one reason why the dogma of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction does not survive a close examination. 
 
It is widely agreed that epistemic and esthetic values are inevitably involved in 
the process of selection of scientific theories. The idea that scientific theories must be 
judged as a whole means that these values are reflected to some extent even in apparently 
purely observational sentences of the theory. To avoid this objection, Carnap tried to 
systematize the process of theory selection so as to avoid this problem, but could not 
succeed. A concrete example in the context of economic theory may be helpful in 
clarifying this issue. 
 
  The Pareto principle is widely accepted and regarded as a scientific and ethically 
neutral way of making welfare comparisons by economists. On the other hand, going 
further to recommend redistributions requires “unscientific” value judgments. This is a 
faithful representation of Locke’s theories of property: the initial property endowments 
must not be called into question, even if they leave some segments of the society 
starving, while others have far beyond their need. This leads to the paradoxical position 
that it is scientific and objective to support property rights over the basic needs of the 
poor, while it is unscientific and value-laden to advocate basic needs over property rights. 
The problem arises because the Pareto principle, which appears perfectly objective, 
reflects background commitments made elsewhere in the theory. As we have already 
seen, changing these commitments leads to equally objective alternatives, such as the 
Pareto-Style Longevity principle.      
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Carnap (cited in Putnam, 2002, p. 18) writes that “All statements belonging to … Ethics .. are 
unverifiable … and unscientific. … we describe such statements as nonsense.” The positivist 
attitude of respect for science, and open contempt for the “unscientific” was absorbed by 
the vast majority of the community of scholars in the twentieth century. Strangely 
enough, the philosophers subsequent rejection of positivism has not been equally 
influential. Positivism is sufficiently deep that efforts to prove its central propositions 
engaged some of the best minds of the twentieth century. Its rejection required even 
deeper considerations, the full implications of which have not yet been absorbed. 
 
For economists brought up on positivism – and this is the majority, according to Hands 
(2009, quoted in introduction) – the idea that values underlie economic theories is 
threatening. It is an accusation that economists are irrational, ideological and emotional.  
In a post positivist world, to say that values are entangled with facts is a description, not 
an insult. This is the case for all scientific theories, not just economics. Instead of burying 
values into the framework of our theories and in the selection of relevant facts, 
methodological progress requires an open expression and discussion of these values.  
Weston (1994) enumerates four reasons why economics cannot be value free, and argues 
that, as a first step, we bring these ethical issues into the open air. Once this is done, it 
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will be necessary for economists to learn ethical philosophy of a specialized sort. Some 
objections to this and responses are discussed below; 
 
Economist now generally agree that positivists were wrong about values; these exist, and 
can be meaningfully and rationally discussed, and even that this is useful and important. 
However, they feel that by focusing on observables alone, they can avoid wading into 
these murky waters.   Forceful articulations of this argument and responses to it are 
available in Caplin and Schotter (2008). As we have argued at length in the present 
article, facts and values are inextricably entangled and we cannot discuss one without 
implicitly involving the other.  
 
A second common argument is that mathematical optimization problems are crisp and 
clear, while ethical arguments are deep and murky, and have been discussed for centuries 
without resolution. Furthermore, economists are not equipped with relevant skills to solve 
them.  This argument is the analog of looking for the key under the lamppost instead of 
where it was dropped in the dark. Sen has said that “it is better to be vaguely right than 
precisely wrong.” Once the inevitability of dealing with ethical issues is recognized, 
economists will acquire the relevant training. This should be considered as a challenge 
and an opportunity to explore new realms of intellectual possibilities. As Weston (1994) 
has noted, precisely the same process occurred when mathematical skills were seen to be 
necessary by the profession. Substantial progress has already been made, and there exists 
sufficient material and in-depth treatments of ethics and economics for several courses at 
both undergraduate and graduate levels. We need to organize this material into courses, 
and make such courses part of the standard curriculum in economics.  
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